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ABSTRACT 
 
In this article I will present the main ideas of those thinkers who argue that natural 
sciences are receptive to a hermeneutical method of understanding. I will examine to 
what degree understanding used as a method in natural sciences differs from 
understanding used as a method in humanities and point out the universality of 
hermeneutical experience. At the beginning, I will state the authors who set sharp borders 
between the methods used in natural sciences and methods used in humanities. They 
regard hermeneutics exclusively as a method used in social sciences that is not capable of 
reaching the cognitive objectivity innate to natural sciences. However, by means of 
several examples from contemporary philosophy of science it can be proved that this 
classification is not valid. 
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EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY FROM 
HERMENEUTICS TO RICOEUR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this inquiry is to show that the distinction between natural sciences and humanities in the history 
of science was based on the distinction between explanation ( Erklären ) and understanding ( Verstehen ). The 
relationship between explanation and understanding often reflected the relationship between natural sciences 
and humanities in the history of science. These distinctions emphasize the difference between natural and social 
phenomena and imply the existence of binary oppositions in science: explanation/understanding, natural/social, 
objective/subjective, etc. In the following lines I will analyze the relation between explanation and 
understanding in the history of philosophy and science and show the dichotomies these two methods create in 
science. I will try to show on which dichotomies these two methods are founded as well. 
 
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
In the history of philosophy there are three approaches to the relation between natural sciences and humanities. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL MONISM 
 
The first approach to the relation between natural sciences and humanities is methodological monism. It is based 
on the idea that method employed in natural sciences ( mathematical exactitude ) is an ideal which should be 
applied to all sciences, even humanities. The proponents of methodological monism, emphasize the unity of the 
scientific method. Those were the ideas of the proponents of positivismi and logical positivismii. 
 
Postivism was found by Auguste Comteiii in the first half of the XIX century. Its main characteristics is 
methodological monism. The proponents of positivism argue about the universality of the method employed in 
natural sciences. Consequently, they claim that this method should be applied to humanities as well. The 
philosophers and historians who accept this ideaiv argue about the unity of scientific method. They ignore the 
subjective experience and argue that scientific explanation is “causal” explanation. 
 
Logical positivism of 1920’s and 1930’s ( or analytical philosophy ), advocates different ideas than positivism. 
However, logical positivism has been in the spirit of positivism. The contributors of analytical philosophyv 
argue that the whole human knowledge can be reduced to logical or scientific explanations. They argue about 
the elimination of metaphysics and subjective experience and advocate methodological monism. 
 
ANTI-POSITIVISM 
 
The second approach to the relation between natural sciences and humanities is anti-positivism. It is founded on 
the idea that natural and human sciences represent two spheres of reality, and, thus, employ different methods in 
exploring realityvi. Those thinkersvii emphasize the difference between natural and human sciences and reject the 
idea of methodological monism.  
 
Wilhelm Dilthey makes a distinction between the methods employed in natural sciences and humanities.viii He 
argues that explanation is the fundamental method used in natural sciences, while understanding is the basic 
method used in human sciences.ix Dilthey argues that scientist explains a particular event by causal relations, 
whereas a historian attempts to understand the meaning of the particular event. Dilthey states that human 
sciences are founded on experience and understanding. 
 
Dilthey argues that understandingx transcends into unfamiliar life expressions through a transposition emerging 
from fullness of one’s own experiences. On the other hand, the method employed in natural sciences consists of 
hypothetical draft of theories and experimental confirmation. 
 
According to Dilthey, the difference between natural and human sciences is not only based on the method, but 
also on the object of knowledge itself. The object of knowledge in natural sciences are the facts emerging from 
the outside world, while the object of knowledge in human sciences is based on inner experience. Therefore, the 
basic method of natural sciences is explanation based on the process of finding the relation between the cause 
and effect, whereas the basic method of human sciences is understanding. 
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In his essay “On the different methods of translation”xi, Fridrich Schleiermacher presents a concept of 
“paraphrase” as a specific method employed in natural sciences, and the concept of “reproduction” as a specific 
method employed in humanities. By means of relation between these two translation methods and their relation 
to the text itself, Schleiermacher explains his view about the relation between natural sciences and humanities. 
According to Schleiermacher a paraphrase tends to overcome the irrationality of language, but only in a 
“mechanical way”. A paraphrase relates to elements of language as to mathematical signs. Natural sciences 
explain nature in the same manner, i.e. mechanically, by means of the causal relations. Reproduction emerges as 
a method of translation diverging from the original text in regard to differences between various languages, 
customs and cultures. Here an opportunity for various interpretations and understanding of the text emerges, as 
no strict regulation on interpretation and comprehension exists. This is the characteristic of the hermeneutic 
method employed in human sciences. Therefore, Schleiermacher indirectly sets the distinction between the 
method of natural sciences and method of human sciences. 
 
Windelband also emphasizes the fact that historical sciences should not employ the method of natural sciences. 
According to Windelband, the fundamental difference between them follows from the fact that natural scientists 
tend to establish general laws, whereas the historians attempt to comprehend a unique and unrepeatable fact. 
 
UNIVERSALITY OF HERMENEUTICS 
 
The third approach is based on the emphasis on the universality of hermeneutics. The representatives of this 
point of view argue that it can be applied to both, human and natural sciences. Proponents of this point of view 
reject the idea that natural sciences are “objective”.xii Habermas and Gadamer, although they advocate the 
universality of hermeneutic experience still emphasize that there are some fundamental differences between 
natural and human sciences. Other representatives from this group reject the idea that the distinction between the 
methods of human and natural sciences exist. 
 
Gadamer and Habermas emphasize the universality of the hermeneutic method, although they argue that there 
are some fundamental differences between natural and human sciences. 
 
According to Habermas, cognitive interest determines scientific objectivity and different interests set borders to 
natural sciences ( i.e. “empirical” and “analytical” sciences ) and humanities ( i.e.  “hermeneutic” and 
“comprehensive” sciencesxiii ). The empirical and analytical procedures are directed towards the comprehension 
of reality or grounds of possible technical disposition, whereas hermeneutic procedures aim to achieve 
intersubjectivity in comprehension during the language communication. Therefore, the first mode of scientific 
knowledge is directed towards technical disposition, and the second towards practice in the sense of 
communication. 
 
On the other hand, Habermas emphasizes the problem of crossing empirical and analytical methods with the 
hermeneutic method, which is of the main importance of the human sciences. In his later works, Habermas 
emphasizes the universality of hermeneutic method.xiv According to Habermas, the choice of research models, 
construction of theories, and sometimes even the development of science depends on decisions and discussions 
of scientific community. Habermas argues that hermeneutic method is also employed in translating the scientific 
information into the everyday language. 
 
Gadamer in his Truth and Method argues that the structure of hermeneutic experience contradicts basically the 
methodical thinking of science and is founded on the “occurring character of language”. Gadamer argues that 
the ideal of science has always been the single-meaning language, which has been proved as unachievable in the 
hermeneutic conception of language. Gadamer claims that single-meaning mathematical-sign language of 
natural sciences could have never been imagined without the language introducing conventions of this language. 
Gadamer emphasizes universality of hermeneutic phenomenon that can be employed not only in human 
sciences, but also in the natural ones. Nevertheless, Gadamer is not prepared to eliminate the difference between 
the two scientific methods. Gadamer sets up sharp borders between the types of experience included in natural 
and human sciences. He emphasizes that moments of tradition are active in human sciences, contrary to the 
natural ones. Application used in hermeneutic interpretation is opposite to the objectivity the natural sciences 
aspire to. This is because natural sciences impose to request to exist out of all subjective applications. On the 
other hand, Gadamer argues that hermeneutic interpretation owns scientific relevance as it discovers the forms 
of truth preceding the logic of scientific research by means of reflection. Gadamer also argues that an 
experiment receives its authorization only in relation to the research context, thus, sciences include hermeneutic 
component. According to Gadamer, hermeneutics is also significant for translating scientific knowledge into 
everyday language. 
29 
 
 
BINARY OPPOSITIONS IN SCIENCE 
 
Apparently, the proponents of these perspectives have different point of views. The first group of authors argue 
about the universality of the scientific explanation. However, this argument is based on the idea about the 
fundamental difference between natural sciences and humanities and their methods. It implies binary 
oppositions: objective/subjective, nature/culture, repeatable/unique, true/constructed, natural/mental etc, where 
the first term designates natural sciences, while the second designates humanities. 
 
In the arguments of the second group of thinkers these dichotomies are even more obvious because they argue 
about the necessity of making the distinction between natural and human sphere ( i.e. explanation and 
understanding ). 
 
The third group of thinkers emphasizes the universality of the method of understanding ( i.e. hermeneutics ).  
However, these authors emphasize the differences between natural and human sphere of reality and emphasize 
binary oppositions: natural/historical, empirical/hermeneutic, technical disposition/language communication, 
etc. 
 
As it is shown, these three perspectives are based on the distinction between natural sciences and humanities and 
the difference between explanation and understanding. Even the philosophers who argue about universality of 
hermeneutics make a distinction between the methods employed in natural sciences and humanities. For 
example, Gadamer and Feyerabend argue about the possibility to apply the method of understanding to natural 
sciences. However, these authors don’t argue that explanation can be applied to humanities. This was argued by 
Levi-Strauss,  Propp, Greimas and Barthes.  They apply structural analysis based on explanation to different 
kinds of narratives.xv They attempt to explain their inner logic, and argue that structural analyses seeks for 
objectivity. Propp makes the structural analyses of folk-tales and argues that they can be explained by 31 
narrative functions. However, they do not try to prove that distinction between the method of explanation and 
the method of understanding must be rejected.xvi These authors do not employ the method of understanding. 
They don’t analyze its relevance neither to natural sciences nor humanities.  
 
Mary Hesse attempts to resolve binary dichotomies present in the history of science in her article “In defense of 
objectivity”. She argues that the distinction between the natural and human sciences that has been made in 
philosophy since Dilthey is not valid. She argues that: 
1) Experience in natural science is not objective and independent from theoretical explanation: “In natural 
science data is not detachable from theory, for what counts as data are determined in the light of some 
theoretical interpretation.”xvii Thus, the dichotomy objective/subjective, whose first term designates natural 
sciences and the second term humanities, is not valid. 
2) “In natural science theories are not models externally compared to nature in hypothetico-deductive schema, 
they are the way the facts themselves are seen.”xviii  Consequently, the binary dichotomy 
analytical/comprehensive whose first term refers to natural sciences and the second one to humanities is flawed. 
3)  “In natural science the law-like relations asserted to the experience are internal, because what counts as facts 
are constituted in what the theory says about their interrelations with one another.”xix Therefore, the dichotomy 
external/internal cannot describe the difference between natural sciences and humanities. 
4) “The language of natural science is irreducibly metaphorical and inexact, and formalizable only at the cost of 
distortion of the historical dynamics of scientific development and of the imaginative constructions in terms of 
which nature is interpreted by science.”xx  Thus, dichotomy true/metaphorical, where the first term refers to the 
language of natural sciences and the second term refers to the language of humanities is not valid.  
5) “Meanings in natural sciences are determined by a theory; they are understood by theoretical coherence rather 
than by correspondence with facts...”xxi Subsequently, the dichotomy logical/hermeneutic cannot describe the 
difference between natural sciences and humanities.  
 
Hesse concludes: “It follows so it is held that the logic of science is necessarily circular: data are interpreted and 
sometimes corrected by coherence with theory, and, at least, in less extreme versions of the account, theory is 
also somehow constrained by empirical data.”xxii 
 
 Mary Hesse argues that hermeneutic method plays an important role in natural sciences. Subsequently, 
hermeneutics represents a universal method. Hesse points to two reasons for placing hermeneutics as a more 
important factor in relation to natural sciences than it has previously seemed to be. First, it indicates that it is 
impossible to make a distinction between the mode of knowledge connected to man’s self-understanding in 
studying the theory of evolution, ecology, or genetics. This means that human values shall be included into 
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applications of such theories, and also that categories of these theories such as functionality, selection, and 
survival have been conditioned by a man’s comprehension of himself. Secondly, theories have always 
represented a part of internal communication system in a particular society. In this case, even the comprehension 
of nature has been formulated by human meanings. 
 
Kuhn and Feyerebend also contributed to the development of the broader perspective of the natural sciences and 
humanities. 
 
In his Structure of Scientific Revolutionsxxiii, Kuhn argues that during different development phases for any 
science, scientists differently describe phenomena and interpret them in different ways. In the absence of a 
paradigmxxiv, all facts that might be related to development of any particular science are seen as equally relevant. 
According to Kuhn, science does not own an objective method that is independent from various interpretations 
and evaluations of the scientific community, and he regards the character of sciences as hermeneutic. Kuhn 
maintains that the existence of paradigm does not necessarily entail the existence of a group of rules. Scientists 
may be in accord when identifying a paradigm, and in discord in relation to its interpretation and rationalization. 
Acceptance of a new paradigm often entails different definitions of a particular science. Thus, when the 
paradigm changes, significant changes that determine the authorization of the problem, as well as of the 
solutions proposed, occur. Having in mind that no paradigm ever solves all the problems defined thereby, and 
that there are no two paradigms, which leave unsolved all identical problems, dissertations on paradigm include 
the following question: “What problems are more important to solve?” Kuhn emphasizes that this question 
points to the fact that evaluation and interpretation system cannot be excluded from science and that science 
claims no right to objectivity. 
 
According to Kuhn, scientific community influences the majority of the members in a group to finally accept 
that a particular group of arguments is prevailing in articulation to another. According to Kuhn, this process may 
be called “persuasion”, and this represents the hermeneutics’ field of action. 
 
 In his Against Method xxv Paul Feyerabend argues that several traditions in research ( “paradigms” ) may co-
exist simultaneously, and that none of them might be regarded as definitely rejected. This makes various 
interpretations possible and points to the application of the hermeneutic method in the scientific field as well. 
Therefore, strict objectivity of science that exclude all interpretation and evaluation is not possible.  
 
As it is argued, Hesse, Kuhn and Feyerabend, develop a broader picture of science in which science and life, 
external and internal, true and metaphorical, natural and cultural are not divided. These authors argue about the 
universality of the method of understanding and its relevance to natural sciences. They overcome the traditional 
dualism natural/humane. However, they still do not analyze the distinction between explanation and 
understanding, which is crucial for both natural science and humanities.  
 
RICOEUR’S THEORY OF DIALECTICS BETWEEN EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING        
 
The significance of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is that he showed that the method of explanation cannot be divided 
from the method of understanding. He opened new perspective to natural sciences and humanities and the 
distinction between them which was made in the history of science. 
 
Although there are different theories of scientific explanation and different methods of understanding, it is 
argued that explanation is objective, while understanding is subjective. 
 
There are different theories of explanation in science. Hempel argues about three models which scientific 
explanation consists: deductive-nomological, deductive-statistical and inductive-statistical model.xxvi On the 
other hand, there are theorists who defend theory of explanation based on statistical-relevance. They criticize 
Hempel’s theory that scientific explanations must be founded on the argument. Salmon argues that the main 
criteria for scientific explanations “must be objective, independent of personal, psychological 
considerations”.xxviiThere are many other theories of explanation and they are based on different methodologies. 
 
There are also different theories about method of understanding in the history of philosophy. Ricoeur’s theory of 
text is an attempt to overcome “romantic hermeneutics” which dominated since Schleiermacher and Dilthey. It 
is often argued that Schleiermacher and Dilthey equate the method of understanding with understanding 
author’s intention.  However, Ricoeur and many other authors make partly incorrect remarks on romantic 
hermeneutics. In Hermeneutics and Criticism (1838), Schleiermacher argues that interpretation is a twofold 
process, which includes both author and the text as objects of interpretation. He makes distinction between 
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psychological understanding ( which aims to reproduce author’s intention and his creation of meaning ) and 
grammatical understanding ( which is based on the meaning of the text itself ). In his essay “The understanding 
of others and their manifestations of life” (1910), Dilthey introduces a broadened concept of hermeneutics 
which is not based on empathy and reconstruction of the author’s intention. He introduces the type of 
understanding, which is based on the articulating the meaning of the text itself. 
 
Ricoeur argues that he cannot accept “the irrationalism of immediate understanding”xxviii based on empathy. 
However, he also cannot accept “a rationalistic explanation that would extend the structural analysis of the sign 
systems to the text”.xxix Thus, Ricoeur rejects on the on hand, romanticist point of view about the congeniality 
between the author and the reader, and on the other hand positivist point of view of textual objectivity 
“independent of the subjectivity of both author and reader”.xxx  Ricoeur states that to understand the text means 
to extend one’s experience and one’s picture of the world through the comprehension of possible worlds and 
world-propositions opened by the text. 
 
Ricoeur attempts to show that methods of explaining and understanding may not easily be divided as Dilthey 
has thought. For Dilthey, this distinction means that these two concepts are mutually excluded – either we make 
explanations of facts as scientist or we interpret them as a historian. These two terms for Dilthey divide two 
spheres of reality. Ricoeur argues that even the ordinary language undermines Dilthey’s dichotomy, because 
when something is not understood – explanation is requested, and when something is understood, it may be 
explained. 
 
Heideger perceives understanding as an ontological category, while Gadamer argues that understanding is 
determined by tradition. Ricoeur attempts to overcome all one-sided conceptions, not only romanticist and 
positivist, but ontological and existential as well. He gives new a perspective on the interpretation and defines it 
as a dialectics between explanation and understanding. 
 
In his essay “What is text?”, Ricoeur states that both terms, explanation and understanding, have undergone 
changes. The term “explanation” is no longer taken from natural sciences, but also from the linguistic model. 
The term “understanding” has in contemporary hermeneutics undergone alterations that estranged it from the 
psychological term of comprehension in Dilthey’s meaning. 
 
Ricour argues that “understanding is not the subjective side and explanation the objective one. Subjectivity is 
not a prison and objectivity is not our liberation from this prison. Far from conflicting, subjectivity and 
objectivity reinforce each other.”xxxi  
 
Ricoeur advocates complementary characteristics of explanation and understanding. He argues that explanation 
cannot be excluded from human sciences. He gives an example of the myth that can be explained through 
structural analysis. However, this does not mean that we have interpreted it, or understood it. Ricoeur argues 
that by means of structural analyses, myth can be explained. But this does not mean that it is understood as well. 
Levi Strauss divides the myth into its basic units, which he names “mythems”. However, these basic units are 
part of the sentences which bear the meaning and, thus, require understanding. According to Ricoeur 
interpretation of the myth consists of explanation which leads to “surface semantics” ( mostly consisted of 
oppositions, such as life/death ) and understanding, which leads to “depth semantics” which leads to the “real 
reference” of the myth. Ricoeur argues “Whereas semiotic units are systems of inner dependencies, and for that 
reason constitute closed and finite sets, the sentence as the first semantic unit is related to extralinguistic reality; 
it is open to the world.”xxxii 
 
In  his “Metaphor and the central problem of hermeneutics”, Ricoeur asserts that he connects the problem of 
explanation to the dimension of “sense”, “or the immanent pattern of discourse”xxxiii, and, on the other hand, he 
connects the problem of interpretation to the dimension of “reference”, which represents the power of discourse 
to apply itself to an extralinguistic reality. Ricoeur argues that the “sense” is “what” and the “reference” the 
“about what” of  discourse.xxxiv 
             
Ricoeur’s equation of the explanation with “sense” and understanding with “reference”xxxv is contrary to the 
examples in the history of philosophy and science. It is argued that scientific texts can be explained and that 
they have a reference, because they truly describe and explain our reality. On the other hand, it is argued that 
literary texts to which the method of understanding can be applied don’t have a reference, because they are 
fictional. 
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According to Frege, striving for the truth moves us from sense to reference. But the desire for the truth is often 
ascribed only to scientific statements. Therefore, literary and poetic texts have no reference, only sense. This 
approach to literary texts can also be found in the history of literature of theories of Russian formalists and 
French structuralists.xxxvi Russian formalists and French structuralists denied the referential nature of the literary 
and poetic texts.xxxvii They denied any kind of exterior motivation of the literary text. French structuralists 
excluded anything that was outside the discourse itself in their analyses of the narrative texts. According to 
Ricoeur, structural analyses is only the starting point of an interpretation of literary works. He argues that 
meaning is produced at the level of sentences – not at the level of words. According to Ricoeur, reference cannot 
only be ascribed to scientific statements and texts. He argues that literary and poetic texts have a reference. In 
his article “What is text?”, Ricoeur argues that the nature of reference in literary texts brings a different 
approach to the concept of interpretation. “It implies that the meaning of a text lies not behind the text, but in 
front of it. The meaning is not something hidden, but something disclosed. What gives rise to understanding is 
what points towards a possible world by means of the non-ostensive references of the text. (…) Disclosure plays 
the equivalent role in written texts as ostensive references play in spoken language. Interpretation thus becomes 
the apprehension of the proposed worlds that are opened up by the non-ostensive references of the text.”xxxviii 
 
Ricoeur maintains that interpretation is not a “third term” of the dialectic between explanation and 
understanding – “it is understanding applied to the written expressions of life.”xxxix Ricoeur’s theory of 
interpretation is the project which includes the close connection between the text and the reader. This 
engagement is a process of redescribing the world. Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation includes both explanation 
– and its analytic power, on the one hand, and unitary power of understanding, on the other hand.       
Consequently, all texts, not only scientific, but historical and fictional, have both sense and reference. Both 
methods, explanation and understanding can be applied to all these kinds of texts, as parts of the process of 
interpretation which is universal. 
   
Ricoeur’s conception of interpretation employed in his narrative theory embraces the dialectics between the 
explanation ( which he equates with mythos - emplotment ) and heuristic fiction ( which he links to the problem 
of “sense” ) and understanding ( which he equates with mimesis and redescription and the problem of 
“reference” ). Ricour’s theory of interpretation, unifies theory and praxis, method and life, science and human 
action. His theory of interpretation cannot only be applied to narratives, but to scientific theories as well. 
Meaning is a process of creation and discovery in both Ricoeur’s narrative theory and science. 
 
EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE 
 
Even those scientists and philosophers who reject Ricour’s theory about dialectics between explanation and 
understanding and the relevance of hermeneutics for sciences ( especially natural sciences ) cannot deny the 
changes the science had undergone after Einstein’s theory of relativity. Einsten’s theory emphasizes the position 
of the observer and relativity of measurements. On the other hand, Heisenberg argues that theories do not 
interpret themselves they are in need of the subject who interprets them. They are many authors who argue that 
hermeneutics can be applied to natural sciencesxl because it cannot only be linked to textuality. “…As Eger, 
Heelan, and Ihde say all insist, though in different ways, the working-out of a hermeneutical approach to science 
has become increasingly urgent. One reason is simply the growing complexity of science, and the need for 
conceptual tools adequate to the task of understanding things like the integrative changes brought about by 
advanced computational infrastructure, knowledge networks, and universal information flow, which promise to 
work important changes on social life.”xli  
 
The picture of contemporary science leaves room for hermeneutic approach.xlii Recently, in the history of 
science there have been many debates between realists and antirealists. These debates between realists and 
antirealists show that science is in constant need for clarification and justification of its main concepts. Realists 
argue that science is a mimesis of reality. They argue that scientific knowledge is objective and that mind 
independent reality exists.xliii However, although they argue about objectivity of science and knowledge, and 
relevance of hermeneutics ( i.e. the method of understanding employed in science ) they differently explain 
some basic concepts employed in science. Kukla defines the success of scientific theories as follows: “By the 
‘success of science’ I mean that our scientific theories enable us to make significantly more correct predictions 
than we could make without them”xliv According to Kukla, the success of science is irrelevant for truth. On the 
other hand, Psillos emphasizes the importance of defining the meaning of the notion “success of science” for 
scientific realism. There is also no coherent version of “approximate truth” among realists. Consequently, 
realists did not solve the problem about relation between truth, success and reference of scientific theories.  
 
33 
 
The development of quantum mechanics requires revision of the great number of concepts and objects of 
Newton’s physics. The necessity of the interpretation of the theoryxlv is emphasized. 
 
In the debate between realists and antirealistsxlvi and antirealists about what reality is, what the success of 
science is, how concepts refer to reality, and what the link between reality and referent is, the hermeneutical 
approach is needed.  
 
This brings us back to Ricoeur’s theory about dialectics between explanation and understanding and 
impossibility to divide these two spheres of reality. The problems in the contemporary science and its history 
show that resolution of underlying binary oppositions is the main condition for the scientific progress. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The distinction between methods employed in natural sciences and humanities is based on binary oppositions 
that exist in science. There are different perspectives on methods that can be employed in natural sciences and 
humanities in the history of science and philosophy. However, all these perspectives are founded on binary 
oppositions which are reflected in the distinction between explanation and understanding. Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics is significant for science, because of his theory of dialectics between explanation and 
understanding. He resolves binary opposition explanation/understanding and shows the path how other binary 
dichotomies that exist in the contemporary science and its history can be resolved.  
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